BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
82.163.0.0/19
Announced exactly
- 82.163.0.0/19AS8851EDGE ta GCI ComRPKI Valid82.163.0.0
- Registry
- RIPE NCC · United Kingdom · Jul 25, 2003
- Delegated block
- 82.163.0.0 – 82.163.31.255
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 82.163.0.0/23AS8851EDGE ta GCI ComRPKI Valid82.163.0.0
- 82.163.0.0/24AS213476LITLINKRPKI Valid82.163.0.0
- 82.163.4.0/22AS8851EDGE ta GCI ComRPKI Valid82.163.4.0
- 82.163.5.0/24AS25369BANDWIDTH-ASRPKI Valid82.163.5.0
- 82.163.7.0/24AS213929UP-NETWORK SwitzerlandRPKI Valid82.163.7.0
- 82.163.8.0/21AS8851EDGE ta GCI ComRPKI Valid82.163.8.0
- 82.163.8.0/24AS199863CORCELINKRPKI Valid82.163.8.0
- 82.163.10.0/23AS212238CDNEXTRPKI Valid82.163.10.0
- 82.163.15.0/24AS134135UBER-AS-AP Uber TechnologiesRPKI Valid82.163.15.0
- 82.163.16.0/23AS8851EDGE ta GCI ComRPKI Valid82.163.16.0
- 82.163.19.0/24AS16509Amazon.com, Inc.RPKI Valid82.163.19.0
- 82.163.20.0/23AS8851EDGE ta GCI ComRPKI Valid82.163.20.0
- 82.163.21.0/24AS211091IPHOUSERPKI Valid82.163.21.0
- 82.163.22.0/24AS55720GIGABIT-MY Gigabit Hosting Sdn BhdRPKI Valid82.163.22.0
- 82.163.24.0/24AS153383NAZIMHOST-AS-AP Nazim HostRPKI Valid82.163.24.0
- 82.163.25.0/24AS153383NAZIMHOST-AS-AP Nazim HostRPKI Valid82.163.25.0
- 82.163.26.0/24AS153383NAZIMHOST-AS-AP Nazim HostRPKI Valid82.163.26.0
- 82.163.27.0/24AS153383NAZIMHOST-AS-AP Nazim HostRPKI Valid82.163.27.0
- 82.163.28.0/24AS141738NOORHOSTCOMBD-AS-AP noorhost.com.bdRPKI Valid82.163.28.0
- 82.163.29.0/24AS141738NOORHOSTCOMBD-AS-AP noorhost.com.bdRPKI Valid82.163.29.0
- 82.163.30.0/24AS141738NOORHOSTCOMBD-AS-AP noorhost.com.bdRPKI Valid82.163.30.0
- 82.163.31.0/24AS141738NOORHOSTCOMBD-AS-AP noorhost.com.bdRPKI Valid82.163.31.0
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 193.166.0.0/15. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.