BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
59.24.0.0/13
Announced exactly
- 59.24.0.0/13AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI Not found59.24.0.0
- Registry
- APNIC · South Korea · Aug 2, 2004
- Delegated block
- 59.0.0.0 – 59.31.255.255
Covering routes
- 59.16.0.0/12AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI Not found59.16.0.0
- 59.0.0.0/11AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI Not found59.0.0.0
More-specific routes
- 59.25.64.0/24AS38104Hyejeon UniversityRPKI Not found59.25.64.0
- 59.25.65.0/24AS38104Hyejeon UniversityRPKI Not found59.25.65.0
- 59.25.66.0/24AS38104Hyejeon UniversityRPKI Not found59.25.66.0
- 59.25.67.0/24AS38104Hyejeon UniversityRPKI Not found59.25.67.0
- 59.25.68.0/24AS38104Hyejeon UniversityRPKI Not found59.25.68.0
- 59.26.6.0/24AS9782WooSong UniversityRPKI Not found59.26.6.0
- 59.26.7.0/24AS18029Daejeon Helath Sciences CollegeRPKI Not found59.26.7.0
- 59.26.221.0/24AS9775Hannam UniversityRPKI Not found59.26.221.0
- 59.26.222.0/24AS9775Hannam UniversityRPKI Not found59.26.222.0
- 59.26.223.0/24AS9775Hannam UniversityRPKI Not found59.26.223.0
- 59.27.104.0/24AS10058NACUFOKRPKI Not found59.27.104.0
- 59.27.163.0/24AS23552Korea Nazarene UniversityRPKI Not found59.27.163.0
- 59.27.164.0/22AS23552Korea Nazarene UniversityRPKI Not found59.27.164.0
- 59.27.168.0/24AS23552Korea Nazarene UniversityRPKI Not found59.27.168.0
- 59.29.21.0/24AS55615DOUZONEBIZONRPKI Not found59.29.21.0
- 59.29.54.0/24AS55615DOUZONEBIZONRPKI Not found59.29.54.0
- 59.29.213.128/25AS18034Gangneung-Wonju National UniversityRPKI Not found59.29.213.128
- 59.30.254.0/24AS55615DOUZONEBIZONRPKI Not found59.30.254.0
- 59.31.246.128/25AS4766Korea TelecomRPKI Not found59.31.246.128
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 193.166.0.0/15. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.