BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
36.109.0.0/16
Announced exactly
- 36.109.0.0/16AS4134CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI Valid36.109.0.0
- Registry
- APNIC · China · Jan 17, 2011
- Delegated block
- 36.96.0.0 – 36.127.255.255
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 36.109.14.0/23AS137694CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-KEZHOU-MAN CHINATELECOM Xinjiang Kezhou MAN networkRPKI Valid36.109.14.0
- 36.109.96.0/21AS137694CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-KEZHOU-MAN CHINATELECOM Xinjiang Kezhou MAN networkRPKI Valid36.109.96.0
- 36.109.112.0/22AS137694CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-KEZHOU-MAN CHINATELECOM Xinjiang Kezhou MAN networkRPKI Valid36.109.112.0
- 36.109.116.0/22AS137694CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-KEZHOU-MAN CHINATELECOM Xinjiang Kezhou MAN networkRPKI Valid36.109.116.0
- 36.109.120.0/22AS137694CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-KEZHOU-MAN CHINATELECOM Xinjiang Kezhou MAN networkRPKI Valid36.109.120.0
- 36.109.139.0/24AS140553CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-SHENGJI-5G-NETWORK CHINATELECOM XINJIANG province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid36.109.139.0
- 36.109.144.0/20AS140553CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-SHENGJI-5G-NETWORK CHINATELECOM XINJIANG province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid36.109.144.0
- 36.109.144.0/21AS140553CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-SHENGJI-5G-NETWORK CHINATELECOM XINJIANG province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid36.109.144.0
- 36.109.152.0/21AS140553CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-SHENGJI-5G-NETWORK CHINATELECOM XINJIANG province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid36.109.152.0
- 36.109.176.0/21AS140553CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-SHENGJI-5G-NETWORK CHINATELECOM XINJIANG province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid36.109.176.0
- 36.109.176.0/22AS140553CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-SHENGJI-5G-NETWORK CHINATELECOM XINJIANG province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid36.109.176.0
- 36.109.180.0/22AS140553CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-SHENGJI-5G-NETWORK CHINATELECOM XINJIANG province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid36.109.180.0
- 36.109.200.0/21AS140553CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-SHENGJI-5G-NETWORK CHINATELECOM XINJIANG province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid36.109.200.0
- 36.109.200.0/22AS140553CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-SHENGJI-5G-NETWORK CHINATELECOM XINJIANG province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid36.109.200.0
- 36.109.204.0/22AS140553CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-SHENGJI-5G-NETWORK CHINATELECOM XINJIANG province Shengji 5G networkRPKI Valid36.109.204.0
- 36.109.240.0/22AS137694CHINATELECOM-XINJIANG-KEZHOU-MAN CHINATELECOM Xinjiang Kezhou MAN networkRPKI Valid36.109.240.0
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 193.166.0.0/15. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.