BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
2a03:6f00::/29
Announced exactly
- 2a03:6f00::/29AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00::
- Registry
- RIPE NCC · Russia · Apr 6, 2011
- Delegated block
- 2a03:6f00:: – 2a03:6f07:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Covering routes
No less-specific route covers it.
More-specific routes
- 2a03:6f00:1::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:1::
- 2a03:6f00:2::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:2::
- 2a03:6f00:3::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:3::
- 2a03:6f00:4::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:4::
- 2a03:6f00:5::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:5::
- 2a03:6f00:6::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:6::
- 2a03:6f00:8::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:8::
- 2a03:6f00:9::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:9::
- 2a03:6f00:a::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:a::
- 2a03:6f00:b::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:b::
- 2a03:6f00:c::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:c::
- 2a03:6f00:12::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:12::
- 2a03:6f00:13::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:13::
- 2a03:6f00:14::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:14::
- 2a03:6f00:16::/48AS204427Timeweb, LLPRPKI Valid2a03:6f00:16::
- 2a03:6f00:19::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f00:19::
- 2a03:6f01:1::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f01:1::
- 2a03:6f02::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f02::
- 2a03:6f02:2::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f02:2::
- 2a03:6f07:fffc::/48AS9123JSC "TIMEWEB"RPKI Valid2a03:6f07:fffc::
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 193.166.0.0/15. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.