BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
240e:30c::/30
Announced exactly
- 240e:30c::/30AS4134No.31,Jin-rong StreetRPKI Valid240e:30c::
- Registry
- APNIC · China · Dec 14, 2011
- Delegated block
- 240e:200:: – 240e:3ff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff
Covering routes
More-specific routes
- 240e:30c:1a00::/39AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30c:1a00::
- 240e:30c:1c00::/38AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30c:1c00::
- 240e:30c:2000::/37AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30c:2000::
- 240e:30c:2800::/38AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30c:2800::
- 240e:30c:2c00::/39AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30c:2c00::
- 240e:30d:1a00::/39AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30d:1a00::
- 240e:30d:1c00::/38AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30d:1c00::
- 240e:30d:2000::/37AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30d:2000::
- 240e:30d:2800::/38AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30d:2800::
- 240e:30d:2c00::/39AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30d:2c00::
- 240e:30e:1a00::/39AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30e:1a00::
- 240e:30e:1c00::/38AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30e:1c00::
- 240e:30e:2000::/37AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30e:2000::
- 240e:30e:2800::/38AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30e:2800::
- 240e:30e:2c00::/39AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30e:2c00::
- 240e:30f:1a00::/39AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30f:1a00::
- 240e:30f:1c00::/38AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30f:1c00::
- 240e:30f:2000::/37AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30f:2000::
- 240e:30f:2800::/38AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30f:2800::
- 240e:30f:2c00::/39AS134762CHINANET Liaoning province Dalian MAN networkRPKI Valid240e:30f:2c00::
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 193.166.0.0/15. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.