BGP Prefix Lookup
Enter a prefix (or a single address). Answered from our daily copy of the global routing table.
213.42.0.0/18
Announced exactly
- 213.42.0.0/18AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI Not found213.42.0.0
- Registry
- RIPE NCC · United Arab Emirates · Sep 29, 1999
- Delegated block
- 213.42.0.0 – 213.42.31.255
Covering routes
- 213.42.0.0/16AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI Not found213.42.0.0
More-specific routes
- 213.42.0.0/19AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI Valid213.42.0.0
- 213.42.28.0/24AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI Valid213.42.28.0
- 213.42.32.0/20AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI Valid213.42.32.0
- 213.42.48.0/24AS204206Digital Dubai Government EstablishmentRPKI Valid213.42.48.0
- 213.42.49.0/24AS204206Digital Dubai Government EstablishmentRPKI Valid213.42.49.0
- 213.42.50.0/24AS204206Digital Dubai Government EstablishmentRPKI Valid213.42.50.0
- 213.42.51.0/24AS204206Digital Dubai Government EstablishmentRPKI Valid213.42.51.0
- 213.42.52.0/24AS204206Digital Dubai Government EstablishmentRPKI Valid213.42.52.0
- 213.42.53.0/24AS204206Digital Dubai Government EstablishmentRPKI Valid213.42.53.0
- 213.42.54.0/24AS204206Digital Dubai Government EstablishmentRPKI Valid213.42.54.0
- 213.42.55.0/24AS204206Digital Dubai Government EstablishmentRPKI Valid213.42.55.0
- 213.42.56.0/24AS204206Digital Dubai Government EstablishmentRPKI Valid213.42.56.0
- 213.42.57.0/24AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI Valid213.42.57.0
- 213.42.58.0/23AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI Valid213.42.58.0
- 213.42.60.0/22AS5384EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSCRPKI Valid213.42.60.0
On the internet, routes are announced as prefixes: an autonomous system tells its neighbours via BGP that it can deliver traffic for, say, 193.166.0.0/15. This tool looks a prefix up in our daily copy of the global routing table and shows three things:
- Exact announcements: which AS originates exactly this prefix. More than one origin (a MOAS) is normal for anycast services and some multihomed networks, and suspicious otherwise.
- Covering routes: less-specific announcements that contain it. Traffic follows the most specific route, so a covering route matters if the more-specific one disappears.
- More-specifics: announcements inside it, which may belong to other networks (customers, or a hijack).
Each announced route is also checked against the RPKI: whether a ROA authorises its origin AS.
The table is the view from APNIC’s route collector. Most of the global table is the same from everywhere, but a route that is filtered before it reaches that collector will not appear.
Frequently asked questions
Why is my /24 not listed but a /16 is?
Your addresses are announced as part of the larger block, and no one announces the /24 separately. That is the normal case for most customers of a provider.
What is a more-specific hijack?
Someone announces a longer prefix inside your space. Because routers prefer the most specific route, traffic goes to them. RPKI with a strict max length makes such announcements invalid.
Can I enter a single address?
Yes. The tool then shows the most specific announced route that contains it.